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Abstract—Fail-stop and silent errors are omnipresent on large-
scale platforms. Efficient resilience techniques must accommodate
both error sources. To cope with the double challenge, a two-
level checkpointing and rollback recovery approach can be used,
with additional verifications for silent error detection. A fail-
stop error leads to the loss of the whole memory content, hence
the obligation to checkpoint on a stable storage (e.g., an external
disk). On the contrary, it is possible to use in-memory checkpoints
for silent errors, which provide a much smaller checkpointing and
recovery overhead. Furthermore, recent detectors offer partial
verification mechanisms that are less costly than the guaranteed
ones but do not detect all silent errors. In this paper, we show
how to combine all of these techniques for HPC applications
whose dependency graph forms a linear chain. We present
a sophisticated dynamic programming algorithm that returns
the optimal solution in polynomial time. Simulation results
demonstrate that the combined use of multi-level checkpointing
and verifications leads to improved performance compared to the
standard single-level checkpointing algorithm.
Index Terms—resilience, fail-stop errors, silent errors, multi-
level checkpoint, verification, dynamic programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Resilience is one of the major challenges for extreme-scale
computing [12], [13]. In particular, several types of errors
should be considered. In addition to the classical fail-stop
errors (such as hardware failures), silent errors, also known
as silent data corruptions, constitute another threat that cannot
be ignored any longer [19], [20], [24], [25]. In order to deal
with both types of errors, a traditional checkpointing and
rollback recovery strategy can be used [15], coupled with a
verification mechanism to detect silent errors [8], [16], [22].
Such a verification mechanism can be either general-purpose
(e.g., based on replication [17] or even triplication [18])
or application-specific (e.g., based on algorithm-based fault
tolerance (ABFT) [11], on approximate re-execution for ODE
and PDE solvers [9], or on orthogonality checks for Krylov-
based sparse solvers [16], [22]).
Because verification mechanisms can be costly, alternative
techniques capable of rapidly detecting silent errors, with the
risk of missing some errors, have been recently developed and
studied [2], [3], [10], [14]. We call these verifications partial
verifications, while perfect verifications (with no error missed)
are referred to as guaranteed verifications. Furthermore, rather
than checkpointing only on a stable storage (e.g., an external
disk), a lightweight mechanism of in-memory checkpoints can
be provided: one keeps a local copy of the data that has not
been corrupted when a silent error strikes, and it can be used
to perform a recovery rapidly. However, such local copies are
lost if a fail-stop error occurs, and hence copies on stable
storage must also be provided.
Designing resilience algorithms by combining all of these
techniques is challenging. In this paper, we deal with a
simplified, yet realistic, application framework, where a set of
application workflows exchange data at the end of their execu-
tion. Such a framework can be modeled as a task graph whose
dependencies form a linear chain. This scenario corresponds
to an HPC application whose workflow is partitioned into a
succession of (typically large) tightly-coupled computational
kernels, each of which is identified as a task. At the end of
each task, we can perform either a partial verification or a
guaranteed verification of the task output; or, probably less
frequently, we can perform a guaranteed verification followed
by a memory checkpoint (we do not take the risk of storing
a corrupted checkpoint, hence the need for a guaranteed
verification); or again, probably even less frequently, we can
perform a guaranteed verification, a memory checkpoint and
a disk checkpoint in a row.
The main contribution of this paper is a sophisticated
dynamic programming algorithm that returns the optimal so-
lution, i.e., the solution that minimizes the expected execution
time, in polynomial time. The originality is that we combine
both types of verifications and both types of checkpoints.
Furthermore, we present extensive simulations that demon-
strate the usefulness of mixing these techniques, and, in
particular, we demonstrate the gain obtained thanks to multi-
level checkpointing.
To the best of our knowledge, the interplay of verifica-
tion mechanisms with two types of checkpoints, in-memory
and disk-based, has never been investigated for task graphs.
Our previous work [6] considers linear chains with a single
checkpoint type and guaranteed verification (for the record,
the pioneering work [23] for linear chains only deals with
a single checkpoint type and no verification). The closest
work to this paper is our recent work [7] for divisible load
applications, where we consider the same combined frame-
work (with two error sources, two checkpoint types and two
verification mechanisms); however, in [7], we target long-
lasting executions, which are partitioned into periodic patterns
that repeat over time, and we compute the best pattern up to
first-order approximations. Here, we do not have the flexibility
of divisible load applications, since we can insert resilience
mechanisms only at the end of the execution of a task. We may
well have a limited number of tasks, which prevents the use of
any periodic strategy. Instead, we take a completely different
approach and design (quite involved) dynamic programming
algorithms that provide the optimal solution for any linear task
graph.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We detail the
model in Section II, before giving the dynamic programming
algorithm in Section III. The simulation results are presented
in Section IV. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V
with hints for future direction.
II. MODEL
We consider a linear chain of tasks T1 → T2 → · · · → Tn,
where each task Ti has a weight wi corresponding to the
computational load. For notational convenience, we define
Wi,j =
∑j
k=i+1 wk to be the time to execute tasks Ti+1 to Tj
for any i < j. Furthermore, we assume that hardware faults
(fail-stop errors) and silent data corruptions (silent errors)
coexist, as motivated in Section I. Since these two types of
errors are caused by different sources, we assume that they are
independent and that both occurrences follow Poisson process
with arrival rates λf and λs, respectively. The probability of
having at least a fail-stop error during the execution of tasks
Ti+1 to Tj is given by p
f
i,j = 1 − e−λfWi,j and that of
having at least a silent error during the same execution is
psi,j = 1− e−λsWi,j .
To deal with both fail-stop and silent errors, resilience is
provided through the use of a two-level checkpointing scheme
coupled with an error detection (or verification) mechanism.
When a fail-stop error strikes, the computation is interrupted
immediately due to a hardware fault, so all the memory content
is destroyed: we then recover from the last disk checkpoint or
start again at the beginning of the application. On the contrary,
when a silent error is detected, either by a partial verification
or by a guaranteed one, we roll back to the nearest memory
checkpoint, and recover from the memory copy there, which
is much cheaper than recovering from the disk checkpoint.
We enforce that a memory checkpoint is always taken
immediately before each disk checkpoint. This can be done
with little overhead and it has been enforced in some practical
multi-level checkpointing systems [5]. Also, a guaranteed
verification is always taken immediately before each memory
checkpoint, so that all checkpoints are valid (both memory and
disk checkpoints), and hence only one memory checkpoint and
one disk checkpoint need to be maintained at any time during
the execution of the application. Furthermore, we assume
that errors only strike the computations, while verifications,
memory copies, and I/O transfers are protected from failures.
Let CD denote the cost of disk checkpointing, CM the
cost of memory checkpointing, RD the cost of disk recovery,
and RM the cost of memory recovery. Recall that when a
disk recovery is done, we also need to restore the memory
state. For simplicity, we assume that the cost RM is included
in the cost RD. Also, let V ∗ denote the cost of guaranteed
verification and V the cost of a partial verification. The
partial verification is also characterized by its recall, which is
denoted by r and represents the proportion of detected errors
over all silent errors that have occurred during the execution.
For notational convenience, we define g = 1 − r to be
the proportion of undetected errors. Note that the guaranteed
verification can be considered as one with recall r∗ = 1. Since
a partial verification usually incurs a much smaller cost and
yet has a reasonable recall [3], [10], it is highly attractive
for detecting silent errors, and we make use of them between
guaranteed verifications.
The objective is to determine where to place disk check-
points, memory checkpoints, guaranteed verifications and par-
tial verifications, in order to minimize the expected execution
time (or makespan) of the application.
III. DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
In this section, we present a sophisticated multi-level dy-
namic programming algorithm to decide which tasks to verify,
which tasks to checkpoint, as well as which type of verification
or checkpoint to perform. Recall that we assumed a memory
checkpoint always comes with a guaranteed verification to
ensure the correctness of the results, and that a disk checkpoint
always comes with a memory checkpoint, as motivated in
Section II.
For convenience, we add a virtual task T0, which is check-
pointed on disk (and hence in memory), and whose recovery
cost is zero. This accounts for the fact that it is always possible
to restart the application from scratch at no extra cost.
We first describe in Section III-A a dynamic programming
algorithm for the case where we use only guaranteed verifi-
cations, memory checkpoints and disk checkpoints. We then
show how to extend this dynamic programming algorithm to
include partial verifications in Section III-B.
A. Without partial verifications
Figures 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the idea of the algorithm
without using partial verifications. The algorithm contains
three dynamic programming levels, which are responsible for
placing disk checkpoints (Figure 1), memory checkpoints (Fig-
ure 2), and guaranteed verifications (Figure 3), respectively.
An additional step follows to compute the expected execution
time between any two verifications. The following describes
each step of the algorithm in detail.
Placing disk checkpoints. The first level focuses on placing
disk checkpoints (see Figure 1). Let the function Edisk(d2)
denote the expected time needed to successfully execute all
the tasks from T1 to Td2 , where task Td2 is verified and
checkpointed both on disk and in memory.
In this function, we try all possible locations for the last
checkpoint before Td2 . For each possible location d1, we
call the function recursively on d1 (to place disk checkpoints
before Td1 ), and we add the expected time needed to execute
the tasks from Td1+1 to Td2 . This is done through the
Emem(d1, d2) function, which also decides where to place
memory checkpoints, and accounts for the cost of memory
checkpoints. The cost of the disk checkpoint CD is finally
added after Td2 . Note that a location d1 = 0 means that no
T0 V ∗CM CD T1 . . . Td1 V ∗CM CD Td1+1 . . . Td2 V ∗CM CD . . .
Edisk(d1) Emem(d1, d2)
Edisk(d2)
Figure 1. Placing disk checkpoints.
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Emem(d1,m1) Everif (d1,m1,m2)
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Figure 2. Placing memory checkpoints.
further disk checkpoints are added. In this case, we simply let
Edisk(0) = 0, which initializes the dynamic program. We can
express Edisk(d2) as follows:
Edisk(d2) = min
0≤d1<d2
{
Edisk(d1) + Emem(d1, d2) + CD
}
.
The total expected time needed to execute all the tasks T1
to Tn is given by Edisk(n).
Placing memory checkpoints. The second level aims at
placing additional memory checkpoints between two disk
checkpoints (see Figure 2). The function is first called from the
first level between two disk checkpoints, each of which also
comes with a memory checkpoint. We define Emem(d1,m2)
as the expected time needed for successfully executing all the
tasks from Td1+1 to Tm2 , where there is a disk checkpoint
at the end of task Td1 , a memory checkpoint at the end of
task Tm2 , and no other disk checkpoints. Note that there
might be a disk checkpoint after Tm2 , for instance when we
first call this function, but we do not account for the cost
of this disk checkpoint in Emem, only for the cost of the
memory checkpoint (the cost of the disk checkpoint is already
accounted for in Edisk).
As before, we try all possible locations for the last
memory checkpoint between tasks Td1 and Tm2 . For each
possible location m1, we call the function recursively on
tasks Td1 to Tm1 , and then call the function for the next
level, Everif (d1,m1,m2), which computes the expected time
needed to execute the tasks from Tm1+1 to Tm2 (and decides
where to place verifications). Finally, we add the cost of
the memory checkpoint CM following Tm2 . We can express
Emem(d1,m2) as follows:
Emem(d1,m2) =
min
d1≤m1<m2
{
Emem(d1,m1) + Everif (d1,m1,m2) + CM
}
.
If m1 = d1, there is no extra memory checkpoint between d1
and m2, and therefore we initialize the dynamic program with
Emem(d1, d1) = 0.
Placing additional verifications. The third level looks for
where to insert additional verifications between two tasks with
memory checkpoints (see Figure 3). The function is first called
. . . Td1 V ∗CM CD . . . Tm1 V ∗CMTm1+1 . . . Tv1 V ∗Tv1+1 . . . Tv2 V ∗ . . .
Everif (d1,m1, v1) E(d1,m1, v1, v2)
Everif (d1,m1, v2)
Figure 3. Placing verifications.
from the second level between two memory checkpoints, each
of which also comes with a verification. Therefore, we define
Everif (d1,m1, v2) as the expected time needed for success-
fully executing all the tasks from Tm1+1 to Tv2 , knowing
that the last memory checkpoint is after Tm1 , the last disk
checkpoint is after Td1 , and there are no checkpoints between
Tm1+1 and Tv2 . Note that Everif (d1,m1, v2) accounts only
for the time required to execute and verify these tasks.
As before, we try all possible locations for the last verifica-
tion between Tm1 and Tv2 , and for each possible location v1,
we call the function recursively on tasks Tm1 to Tv1 . Fur-
thermore, we add the expected time needed to successfully
execute the tasks Tv1+1 to Tv2 , denoted by E(d1,m1, v1, v2),
knowing the position of the last disk checkpoint d1 and
the position of the last memory checkpoint m1. We express
Everif (d1,m1, v2) as follows:
Everif (d1,m1, v2) =
min
m1≤v1<v2
{
Everif (d1,m1, v1) + E(d1,m1, v1, v2)
}
. (1)
Again, the case v1 = m1 means that no further verifica-
tions are added, so we initialize the dynamic program with
Everif (d1,m1,m1) = 0. The verification cost at the end
of Tv2 is accounted for in the function E(d1,m1, v1, v2).
Computing the expected execution time between two ver-
ifications. Finally, to compute the expected time needed for
successfully executing several tasks between two verifications,
we need the position of the last disk checkpoint d1, the position
of the last memory checkpoint m1, and the positions of the
two verifications v1 and v2.
On the one hand, if a fail-stop error occurs with probabil-
ity pfv1,v2 , then the execution stops and we must recover from
the last disk checkpoint. In this case, we lose T lostv1,v2 time, pay
the cost of recovery RD (set to 0 if d1 = 0), and re-execute the
tasks starting from Td1 . The re-execution is done in three steps.
First, we call Emem(d1,m1) to compute the expected time
needed to re-execute the tasks from the last disk checkpoint
after Td1 to the last memory checkpoint after Tm1 . Then,
we call the function Everif (d1,m1, v1) to account for the
time needed to re-execute the tasks between the last memory
checkpoint after Tm1 to the next verification after Tv1 . Finally,
we re-execute tasks Tv1+1 to Tv2 with E(d1,m1, v1, v2).
On the other hand, with probability 1 − pfv1,v2 , there is
no fail-stop error. In this case, we pay Wv1,v2 by executing
all the tasks from Tv1+1 to the next verification after Tv2 .
Then we add the cost of the guaranteed verification V ∗. After
the verification, there is a probability psv1,v2 of detecting a
silent error, in which case we recover from the last memory
checkpoint with a cost RM (set to 0 if m1 = 0) and
only re-execute the tasks from there by calling the function
Everif (d1,m1, v1) followed by E(d1,m1, v1, v2) as before.
Therefore, we have:
E(d1,m1, v1, v2) =
pfv1,v2
(
T lostv1,v2 +RD + Emem(d1,m1)
+ Everif (d1,m1, v1) + E(d1,m1, v1, v2)
)
+
(
1− pfv1,v2
) (
Wv1,v2 + V
∗ + psv1,v2
(
RM
+ Everif (d1,m1, v1) + E(d1,m1, v1, v2)
))
. (2)
In order to compute the expected execution time, we need
to compute T lostv1,v2 , which is the expected time loss due to a
fail-stop error occurring during the execution of tasks Tv1+1
to Tv2 . We can derive:
T lostv1,v2 =
∫ ∞
0
xP(X = x|X < Wv1,v2)dx
=
1
P(X < Wv1,v2)
∫ Wv1,v2
0
xP(X = x)dx ,
where P(X = x) denotes the probability that a fail-stop error
strikes at time x. By definition, we have P(X = x) = λfe−λfx
and P(X < Wv1,v2) = 1 − e−λfWv1,v2 . Integrating by parts,
we get:
T lostv1,v2 =
1
λf
− Wv1,v2
eλfWv1,v2 − 1 . (3)
Now, substituting T lostv1,v2 into Equation (2) and simplifying, we
obtain:
E(d1,m1, v1, v2) = e
λsWv1,v2
(
eλfWv1,v2 − 1
λf
+ V ∗
)
+ eλsWv1,v2
(
eλfWv1,v2 − 1) (RD + Emem(d1,m1))
+
(
e(λs+λf )Wv1,v2 − 1
)
Everif (d1,m1, v1)
+
(
eλsWv1,v2 − 1)RM . (4)
Complexity. The complexity is dominated by the computation
of the table Everif (d1,m1, v2), which contains O(n3) entries,
and each entry depends on at most n other entries that are
already computed. All tables are computed in a bottom-up
fashion, from the left to the right of the intervals. Hence, the
overall complexity of the algorithm is O(n4).
B. With partial verifications
It may be beneficial to further add partial verifications
between two guaranteed verifications. The intuitive idea would
be to add yet another level to the dynamic programming
algorithm, and to replace E(d1,m1, v1, v2) in Equation (1)
by a call to a function E(intuitive)partial (d1,m1, v1, p2, v2), with
p2 = v2, which would compute the expected time needed to
execute all the tasks from Tv1+1 to Tp2 and add further partial
verifications (computed from the left to the right).
However, while the dynamic programming approach was
rather intuitive without partial verifications, the problem be-
comes much harder with partial verifications. The main rea-
son is that when computing an interval between two partial
verifications, there is a probability g that the error remains
undetected after the partial verification. When this happens,
we need to account for the time lost executing the following
tasks until the error is eventually detected (by the subsequent
partial verifications or in the worst case by the guaranteed
verification) or until the execution is interrupted by a fail-
stop error. This is only possible if we know the optimal
positions of the partial verifications after the interval up to
the next guaranteed verification. This requires the dynamic
programming algorithm to first compute the values at the right
of the current interval, hence progressing the opposite way
as what was done so far. Therefore, the function becomes
Epartial(d1,m1, v1, p1, v2) (expected time needed to execute
all the tasks from Tp1+1 to Tv2 ), and it tries all positions p2
for the next partial verification. But then, it also requires to
remove some terms that account for re-executed work from
the intervals on the left of the current interval (because we
do not have this information yet), and to re-inject them later
in the computation. In the end, we have quite a complicated
algorithm.
Expected lost time in case of silent error. First, we compute
Eright(d1,m1, v1, p1, v2), the expected time lost executing the
tasks Tp1+1 to Tv2 , assuming that there was a silent error in
this interval. This computation uses p2, the optimal position of
the verification immediately following p1, which is computed
with the dynamic programming. Indeed, Tp2 may detect the er-
ror or not. If the error is detected by Tp2 , we lose Wp1,p2+V +
RM work, while we use Eright(d1,m1, v1, p2, v2) if the error
remains undetected. Also, we consider fail-stop errors only be-
tween Tp1+1 and Tp2 , because fail-stop errors between Tp2+1
and Tv2 will be accounted for in Eright(d1,m1, v1, p2, v2).
Note that even if we know that there is a silent error in the
interval, we may need to recover from a fail-stop error if it
strikes before the silent error is detected. Altogether, we have:
Eright(d1,m1, v1, p1, v2) =
pfp1,p2
(
T lostp1,p2 +RD + Emem(d1,m1)
)
+ (1− pfp1,p2)
(
Wp1,p2 + V + (1− g)RM
+ gEright(d1,m1, v1, p2, v2)
)
= (1− e−λfWp1,p2 )
( 1
λf
− Wp1,p2
eλfWp1,p2 − 1
+RD + Emem(d1,m1)
)
+ e−λfWp1,p2
(
Wp1,p2 + V + (1− g)RM
+ gEright(d1,m1, v1, p2, v2)
)
.
The initialization is Eright(d1,m1, v1, v2, v2) = RM . Indeed,
in this case, there is no task to execute, and if there was a silent
error, it is therefore immediately detected by v2 (a guaranteed
. . . Td1 V ∗CM CD . . . Tm1 V ∗CMTm1+1 . . . Tv1 V ∗ Tv1+1 . . . Tp1 V Tp1+1 . . . Tp2 V Tp2+1 . . . Tv2 V ∗ . . .
Eleft(v1, p1) E
−(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2) Eright(d1,m1, v1, p2, v2)
Epartial(d1,m1, v1, p1, v2)
Everif (d1,m1, v2)
Figure 4. Placing partial verifications.
verification), and we just pay RM . Knowing p2, we are there-
fore able to compute all values of Eright. We will see later
how we use this knowledge in Eright. Note that the time to re-
execute the tasks after a recovery is omitted here, since it will
be accounted for when computing E(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2),
the expected time needed to successfully execute all the tasks
between two partial verifications (from Tp1+1 to Tp2 ).
Expected time to compute tasks Tp1+1 to Tp2 . Figure 4
shows all the tasks involved in the computation of an interval
consisting of several tasks between two partial verifications at
p1 and p2. Let E(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2) denote the expected
time needed to successfully execute all the tasks from Tp1+1
to Tp2 , knowing that the last disk checkpoint is after Td1 ,
the last memory checkpoint is after Tm1 , the last guaranteed
verification is after Tv1 , and the next guaranteed verification
is after Tv2 .
On the one hand, if a fail-stop error occurs with proba-
bility pfp1,p2 , then the task stops and we must recover from
the last disk checkpoint. We lose T lostp1,p2 time, we pay the
cost for the disk recovery RD, and we need to re-execute
the tasks starting from Td1 . This is done in three steps: first
we call Emem(d1,m1) to compute the expected time needed
to re-execute the tasks from the last disk checkpoint after Td1
to the last memory checkpoint after Tm1 . Then we call the
function Everif (d1,m1, v1) to account for the time needed
to re-execute the tasks between the last memory checkpoint
after Tm1 to the next guaranteed verification after Tv1 , and
finally we are left with the remaining tasks between Tv1+1
and Tp1 . Let Eleft(v1, p1) denote the expected time needed to
re-execute all the tasks from Tv1+1 to Tp1 . Finally, we can re-
execute tasks Tv1+1 to Tv2 by calling E(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2).
On the other hand, there is a probability (1 − pfp1,p2) of
having no fail-stop errors. In that case, we execute all the
tasks from Tp1+1 to the next verification after Tp2 and we
pay Wp1,p2 . Then we add the cost V for the verification.
After the partial verification, there is a probability psp1,p2 of
having a silent error. In this case, we pay a recovery from the
last memory checkpoint (RM ) and re-executed the tasks from
there: we call Everif (d1,m1, v1), followed by Eleft(v1, p1)
and E(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2). Furthermore, if the error was not
detected (with probability g), we use Eright(d1,m1, v1, p2, v2)
to compute the expected time lost executing the tasks follow-
ing Tp2 , knowing that there is an undetected silent error (as
explained earlier). Therefore, we have:
E(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2) =
pfp1,p2
(
T lostp1,p2 +RD + Emem(d1,m1) + Everif (d1,m1, v1)
+ Eleft(v1, p1) + E(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2)
)
+ (1− pfp1,p2)
(
Wp1,p2 + V + p
s
p1,p2
(
Everif (d1,m1, v1)
+ Eleft(v1, p1) + E(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2)
+ (1− g)RM + gEright(d1,m1, v1, p2, v2)
))
.
Substituting T lostp1,p2 into the equation above and simplifying,
we obtain:
E(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2) = e
λsWp1,p2
(
eλfWp1,p2 − 1
λf
+ V
)
+ eλsWp1,p2
(
eλfWp1,p2 − 1) (RD + Emem(d1,m1))
+
(
e(λs+λf )Wp1,p2 − 1
) (
Everif (d1,m1, v1) + Eleft(v1, p1)
)
+
(
eλsWp1,p2 − 1) ((1− g)RM + gEright(d1,m1, v1, p2, v2)).
Finally, because we do not know at this point how to
compute Eleft(v1, p1), we remove the term(
e(λs+λf )Wp1,p2 − 1
)
Eleft(v1, p1)
from E(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2). This corresponds to the amount
of time needed to re-execute all the tasks from Tv1+1 to Tp1
when there is an error between Tp1+1 and Tp2 . This time
will be added back when computing Epartial, as explained
below. Therefore, we introduce the modified expression of E,
denoted E−, as follows:
E−(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2) = eλsWp1,p2
(
eλfWp1,p2 − 1
λf
+ V
)
+ eλsWp1,p2
(
eλfWp1,p2 − 1) (RD + Emem(d1,m1))
+
(
e(λs+λf )Wp1,p2 − 1
) (
Everif (d1,m1, v1)
)
+
(
eλsWp1,p2 − 1) ((1− g)RM + gEright(d1,m1, v1, p2, v2)).
Computing Epartial(d1,m1, v1, p1, v2), the expected time
needed to execute all the tasks from Tp1+1 to Tv2 (and
placing extra partial verifications). Finally, we need to
compute Epartial and to decide when to use additional partial
verifications on tasks that are not yet verified. The function
is first called from the third level between two guaran-
teed verifications, and p1 is originally set to v1. Therefore,
Epartial(d1,m1, v1, p1, v2) denotes the expected time needed
to execute all the tasks from Tp1+1 to Tv2 , where Tp1 is
followed by a partial verification (with the exception of the first
call) and Tv2 is followed by a guaranteed verification, knowing
the position of the last disk checkpoint d1, the position of
the last memory checkpoint m1 and the position of the last
guaranteed verification v1.
Contrarily to the expressions derived in Section III-A, note
that partial verifications are placed from the left to the right.
We use the expression of E−, trying all possible positions p2
for the partial verification following p1, and we account for
the fact that tasks between Tp1+1 and Tp2 may be re-executed
several times (because we removed Eleft from E−). In fact,
for any number of partial verifications between p2 and v2,
we can show that E−(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2) is re-executed
e(λs+λf )Wp2,v2 times, and hence we obtain:
Epartial(d1,m1, v1, p1, v2) =
min
p1<p2≤v2
{
E−(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2) · e(λs+λf )Wp2,v2
+ Epartial(d1,m1, v1, p2, v2)
}
.
The initialization case is for p2 = v2. Then, there is no
re-execution of the interval induced by errors to the right
of p2 (within an Eleft), and therefore we compute only
once E−(d1,m1, v1, p1, v2, v2). Furthermore, the interval is
ended by a guaranteed verification, and therefore we add the
corresponding verification cost:
Epartial(d1,m1, v1, v2, v2) =
E−(d1,m1, v1, p1, v2, v2) + e(λs+λf )Wp1,v2 (V ∗ − V ).
Because partial verifications are placed from the left to the
right, when implementing the algorithm, we first compute
all values of Epartial on the right of the interval, which
are needed to progress towards the left. This is why we
always have the values of the next p2 when computing Eright,
which correspond to the minimum value selected by Epartial.
However, it was not possible to derive the values of the re-
execution for the left part of the interval, hence the trick to
compute the number of times each interval is re-executed, due
to a failure on the right (the term Eleft that is removed from
the initial expression of E).
Accounting for re-executions on the left. Finally, let us
show that for any number of partial verifications between p2
and v2, the function E−(d1,m1, v1, p1, p2, v2) re-executes an
e(λs+λf )Wp2,v2 amount of work. If there are no partial veri-
fications after p2, then it is executed once when progressing
within the computation, and we also need to account for the
e(λs+λf )Wp2,v2 − 1 re-executed work due to the term Eleft
that was suppressed from E−(d1,m1, v1, p2, v2, v2).
With one intermediate partial verification p3 between
p2 and v2, the same reasoning shows that there is an
amount of e(λs+λf )Wp2,p3 re-executed work coming from
the initial execution and the Eleft term suppressed from
E−(d1,m1, v1, p2, p3, v2). Furthermore, there is an amount
of
(
e(λs+λf )Wp3,v2 − 1) re-executed work coming from the
Eleft term of E−(d1,m1, v1, p3, v2, v2). In turn, this re-
executed work incurs e(λs+λf )Wp2,p3 re-executed work (initial
execution and re-executions due to the Eleft term coming
from E−(d1,m1, v1, p2, p3, v2)). Overall, the number of re-
executed work is finally
e(λs+λf )Wp2,p3 +
(
e(λs+λf )Wp2,p3
)(
e(λs+λf )Wp3,v2 − 1
)
,
and therefore there is a total amount of e(λs+λf )Wp2,v2 re-
executed work. It is easy to extend this reasoning to any
number of intervals by induction, assuming that it is true for
i intermediate partial verifications pvi, . . . , pv1, and adding
a partial verification pvi+1 between p2 and pvi. The same
reasoning holds.
Complexity. Clearly, the complexity is now dominated by the
computation of the table Epartial(d1,m1, v1, p1, v2), which
contains O(n5) entries, and each entry depends on at most
n other entries that are already computed. Hence, the overall
complexity of the algorithm is O(n6).
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct a set of simulations to assess the
relative efficiency of our approach under realistic scenarios.
We instantiate the model with actual parameters from the
literature and we compare the performance of three algorithms:
(i) a single-level algorithm ADV ∗ with only disk checkpoints
(and additional guaranteed verifications), (ii) a two-level al-
gorithm combining memory and disk checkpoints ADMV ∗
(as in Section III-A), and (iii) the complete algorithm using
additional partial verifications ADMV (as in Section III-B).
The optimal positions of verifications and disk checkpoints
can be easily derived for ADV ∗ , using a simplification of the
proposed dynamic programming algorithm in Section III-A
with no additional memory checkpoints.
Simulation setup. We make several assumptions on the input
parameters. First, we assume that recovery costs and check-
point costs are similar; following [19], [21], we set recovery
costs to be the same as checkpoint costs, i.e., RD = CD and
RM = CM . Then, we assume that a guaranteed verification
must check all the data in memory, making its cost in the
same order as that of a memory checkpoint, i.e., V ∗ = CM .
Furthermore, we assume partial verifications similar to those
proposed in [3], [4], [10], with very low cost while offering
good recalls. In the following, we set V = V ∗/100 and
r = 0.8. The total computational weight is set to be 25000
seconds and it is distributed uniformly among up to n = 50
tasks in three different patterns shown as follows.
(1) Uniform: all tasks share the same weight W/n, as in
matrix multiplication or in some iterative stencil kernels.
(2) Decrease: task Ti has weight α(n+1− i)2, where α ≈
3W/n3; this quadratically decreasing function resembles some
dense matrix solvers, e.g., by using LU or QR factorization.
(3) HighLow: a set of tasks with large weight is followed
by a set of tasks with small weight. In the simulations, we set
10% of the tasks to be large and let them contain 60% of the
total computational weight.
We point out that all these choices are somewhat arbitrary
and can easily be modified in the evaluations; we believe they
represent reasonable values for current and next-generation
HPC applications. The code is publicly available at http:
//graal.ens-lyon.fr/∼yrobert/chain2levels.zip for the interested
readers to experiment with their own parameters.
Platform settings. Table I presents the four platforms used
in the simulations and their main parameters. These platforms
have been used to evaluate the Scalable Checkpoint/Restart
(SCR) library by Moody et al. [19], who provide accurate
measurements for λf , λs, CD and CM using real applications.
Note that the Hera platform has the worst error rates, with a
platform MTBF of 12.2 days for fail-stop errors and 3.4 days
for silent errors. In comparison, and despite its higher number
of nodes, the Coastal platform features a platform MTBF of
28.8 days for fail-stop errors and 5.8 days for silent errors. In
addition, the last platform uses SSD technology for memory
checkpointing, which provides more data space, at the cost of
higher checkpointing costs.
Table I
PLATFORM PARAMETERS.
platform #nodes λf λs CD CM
Hera 256 9.46e-7 3.38e-6 300s 15.4s
Atlas 512 5.19e-7 7.78e-6 439s 9.1s
Coastal 1024 4.02e-7 2.01e-6 1051s 4.5s
Coastal SSD 1024 4.02e-7 2.01e-6 2500s 180.0s
Impact of number of tasks. The first column of Figure 5
presents, for each platform, the normalized makespan with
respect to the error-free execution time for different numbers
of tasks with the Uniform weight distribution. Note that
varying the number of tasks has an impact on both the size
of the tasks and the maximum number of checkpoints and
verifications an algorithm can place. When the number of tasks
is small (e.g., less than 5), the probability of having an error
during the execution (either a fail-stop or a silent) increases
quickly (more than 10% on Hera) for a single task. As a result,
the application experiences more recoveries and re-executions
with larger tasks, which increases the execution overhead.
However, when the number of tasks is large enough, the size of
the tasks becomes small and the probability of having an error
during the execution of one task drops significantly, reducing
the recovery and re-execution costs at the same time.
Single-level algorithm ADV ∗ . The second column of Fig-
ure 5 shows the numbers of disk checkpoints (with associated
memory checkpoints) and guaranteed verifications used by the
ADV ∗ algorithm on the four platforms and for different num-
bers of tasks. We observe that a large number of guaranteed
verifications is placed by the algorithm while the number of
checkpoints remains relatively small (i.e., less than 5 for all
the platforms). This is because checkpoints are costly, and
verifications help to reduce the amount of time lost due to
silent errors. Since verifications are cheaper, the algorithm
tends to place as many of them as possible, except when their
relative costs also become high (e.g., on Coastal SSD).
Two-level algorithm ADMV ∗ . The third column of Figure 5
presents the numbers of disk checkpoints, memory checkpoints
and guaranteed verifications used by the ADMV ∗ algorithm
on the four platforms and for different number of tasks. We
observe that the number of guaranteed verifications remains
similar to that placed by the ADV ∗ algorithm. However,
the two-level algorithm uses additional memory checkpoints,
which drastically reduces the amount of time lost in re-
execution when a silent error is detected. In particular, we
observe that the algorithm ADMV ∗ always leads to a better
makespan compared to the single-level algorithm ADV ∗ , with
an improvement of 2% on Hera and 5% on Atlas, as shown in
the first column of Figure 5. This demonstrates the usefulness
of the multi-level checkpointing approach.
Two-level algorithm with partial verifications ADMV . The
last column of Figure 5 presents the numbers of disk check-
points, memory checkpoints, guaranteed verifications and ad-
ditional partial verifications used by the ADMV algorithm
on the four platforms and for different numbers of tasks.
Although partial verifications are always more cost-effective
than guaranteed ones, due to the imperfect recall, they are
only worth it if one can use a lot of them, which is only
possible when the number of tasks is large enough. Therefore,
the algorithm only starts to use partial verifications when the
number of tasks is greater than 30 on Hera, 40 on Coastal and
50 on Atlas, where the silent error rate is the highest among
the four platforms. In our setting, adding partial verifications
has a limited impact on the makespan, with the exception
of the Coastal SSD platform, where the cost of checkpoints
and verifications are much higher than on the other platforms.
Partial verifications, being 100 times cheaper than guaranteed
verifications, remain the only affordable resilience tool on this
platform. In this case, we observe an improved makespan
(around 1% with 50 tasks) compared to the ADMV ∗ algorithm,
as shown in the first column of Figure 5.
Distribution of checkpoints and verifications. Figure 6
shows the positions of the disk checkpoints, memory check-
points, verifications and partial verifications obtained by run-
ning the ADMV algorithm on each of the four platforms and
for 50 tasks with the uniform distribution. For all platforms,
the algorithm does not perform any additional disk check-
points. These being costly, the algorithm rather uses more
memory checkpoints and verifications. On most platforms,
the optimal solution is a combination of equi-spaced mem-
ory checkpoints and guaranteed verifications, with additional
partial verifications in-between. However, on the Coastal SSD
platform, the cost of checkpoints and verifications is sub-
stantially higher, which leads the algorithm to choose partial
verifications over guaranteed ones.
Decrease pattern. In the following, we focus on the platforms
Hera and Coastal SSD, which represent both extremes in
terms of size (number of processors) and hardware used
for memory checkpointing (RAM and SSD, respectively).
The first column of Figure 7 presents the performance of
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Figure 5. Performance of the three algorithms on each platform with the Uniform pattern. Each row corresponds to one platform.
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Figure 6. Distribution of disk checkpoints, memory checkpoints and verifications for the ADMV algorithm on each platform with the Uniform pattern.
the three algorithms for different number of tasks and for
the Decrease pattern. The second column shows the number
of disk checkpoints, memory checkpoints, guaranteed and
partial verifications given by the ADMV algorithm. The third
column is a visual representation of the corresponding solution
obtained for 50 tasks and with the same configuration. We
observe that the makespan obtained is very similar for all
three algorithms (with a slight advantage for ADMV ). Since
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Figure 7. Performance of the three algorithms, and distribution of disk checkpoints, memory checkpoints and verifications (for the ADMV algorithm) on
platforms Hera and Coastal SSD with the Decrease pattern.
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Figure 8. Performance of the three algorithms, and distribution of disk checkpoints, memory checkpoints and verifications (for the ADMV algorithm) on
platforms Hera and Coastal SSD with the HighLow pattern.
the large tasks at the beginning of the chain are more likely
to fail, they will be checkpointed more often, as opposed to
the small tasks at the end, which the algorithm does not even
consider worth verifying.
HighLow pattern. Once again, we focus on platforms Hera
and Coastal SSD. Similarly to Figure 7, Figure 8 assesses
the impact of the HighLow pattern on the performance of the
three algorithms as well as on the numbers and the positions of
checkpoints and verifications. Recall that we set the first 10%
of the tasks to contain 60% of the total computational weight,
while the rest of the tasks contain the remaining 40%. With 50
tasks and a total computational weight of 25000s, the first 5
tasks have a weight of 3000s each, while the remaining tasks
have a weight of around 222s each. Under this configuration,
an error occurring during the execution of a large task would
cost T lost ≈ 1500s time loss on average for fail-stop errors (see
Equation (3)) and 3000s for silent errors, plus an additional
3000s time loss for each preceding task that has not been
checkpointed. With the MTBF on Hera, a large task will
fail with probability 1.3%, as opposed to the probability of
0.096% for small tasks. As a result, the disk checkpoint,
which takes 300s, turns out to be still too expensive, but the
memory checkpoint, which takes only 15.4s on Hera, becomes
mandatory: on average an error will occur way before the total
accumulated cost of our preventive memory checkpoints even
adds up to the cost of one task. On Coastal SSD, however,
the memory checkpoint is still quite expensive, so that only
one of the first 5 tasks is marked for verification and memory
checkpointing. On both platforms, since the rest of the tasks
are small, the solution is similar to the one we observed
for the Uniform pattern, except that memory checkpoints and
verifications are less frequent.
Summary of results. Overall, we observe that the combined
use of disk checkpoints and memory checkpoints allows us to
decrease the makespan, for the three task patterns and the four
platforms. The use of partial verifications further decreases
the makespan, especially on the Coastal SSD platform where
the checkpointing costs are high. To give some numbers, our
approach saves 2% of execution time on Hera and 5% on
Atlas. These percentages may seem small, but they correspond
to saving half an hour a day on Hera, and more than one hour
a day on Atlas, with no further overhead.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a two-level checkpointing
scheme to cope with both fail-stop errors and silent data cor-
ruptions on large-scale platforms. Although numerous studies
have dealt with either error source, few studies have dealt
with both, while it is mandatory to address both sources
simultaneously at scale. By combining standard disk check-
pointing technique with in-memory checkpoints and verifica-
tion mechanisms (partial or guaranteed), we have designed
a multi-level dynamic programming algorithm that computes
the optimal solution for a linear application workflow in
polynomial time. Simulations based on realistic parameters
on several platforms show consistent results, and confirm the
benefit of the combined approach. While the most general
algorithm has a high complexity of O(n6), where n is the
number of tasks, it executes within a few seconds for n = 50
tasks, and therefore can be readily used for real-life linear
workflows whose sizes rarely exceed tens of tasks.
One interesting future direction is to assess the usefulness of
this approach on general application workflows. The problem
gets much more challenging, even in the simplified scenario
where each task requires the entire platform to execute. In
fact, in this simplified scenario, it is already NP-hard to decide
which task to checkpoint in a simple join graph (n− 1 source
tasks and a common sink task), with only fail-stop errors
striking (hence a single level of checkpoint and no verification
at all) [1]. Still, heuristics are urgently needed to address the
same problem as in this paper, with two error sources, two
checkpoint types and two verification mechanisms, if we are
to deploy general HPC workflows efficiently at scale.
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